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Abstract Do promotions in a certain category lead to higher
revenues in other categories? If so, to what degree? The
answers to these questions are highly relevant for retailers that
supply products in different categories. Empirical findings in
studies that consider a limited number of categories indicate
small promotional cross-category effects. This study develops
a framework to determine the impact of price promotions on
category revenues that include interdependencies among a
substantial number of categories at the category demand level.
The own- and cross-category demand effects are moderated by
variables such as promotion intensity, category characteristics
(own-category effects), and spatial distances between shelf
locations (cross-category effects). The empirical results based
on daily store-level scanner data show that approximately half
of all price promotions expand own-category revenues,
especially for categories with deeper supported discounts.
There is a high probability (61%) that a price promotion affects
sales of at least one other category. The number of categories
affected is not greater than two. Moderate evidence supports
the existence of cross-promotional effects between categories
more closely located in a store.
Keywords Cross-category effects . Category demand
model . Price promotions . Store-level scanner data . Daily
data
Introduction
Price promotions often result in large sales effects for a
promoted item, but this influence does not necessarily mean
that the sales increase is truly beneficial for retailers and/or
manufacturers (Ailawadi et al. 2006, 2007; Srinivasan et al.
2004). A retailer does not benefit from brand switching within
the store, unless it exploits margin differences. However, a
store could benefit from the impact of price promotions on
store switching or from the impact of price promotions on
category demand in the focal and other categories (cross-
category or cross-promotion effects) (Walters 1991).
Although the impact of promotions can be measured at
the item (SKU), brand and category level, the category
level is the most relevant level for retailers (Ailawadi et al.
2009). Compared with the vast volume of studies pertaining
to the effects of price promotions on brand choice and
brand sales, research on category-demand effects in a retail
store remains sparse.
Most empirical studies based on either household data
(Song and Chintagunta 2007) or store-level data (Leeflang et
al. 2008) demonstrate small cross-category effects. These
studies consider cross-category effects between a small
number or pairs of categories and analyze categories that
appear complementary. Existing literature also reveals
demand interdependencies between unrelated categories,
including those that are not a priori perceived as comple-
ments or substitutes (Campo et al. 2000; Seetharaman et al.
2005). The managerial relevance of outcomes of studies that
only consider complementary categories is thus rather low.
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In this study, we develop a multicategory model that
considers demand interdependencies (substitution and
complementarities) at the product category level. The first
aim of this study is to analyze the impact of promotion
intensity in one category on the attraction of this focal and
other (related and unrelated) categories, using a substantial
number of product categories. We analyze two category
clusters, aperitifs and breakfast products, which consist of
12 and 13 product categories respectively, and use daily
data that refer to a Spanish supermarket. Unlike other
studies that are based on store-level data, we consider cross-
promotion effects of related and less related/unrelated
product categories. Hence the second aim of the study is to
determine cross-promotional effects between these product
categories.
The third aim of this study is to determine which factors
might moderate these own—and cross-elasticities. Extant
research identifies different moderators that determine the size
of (short-run) own price promotion elasticities (see Grewal
and Levy 2007; Nijs et al. 2001). Factors such as promotion
frequency and promotion depth are tools managers might use
to influence demand sensitivity, at least in principle. Some
studies suggest that the location of a promoted category also
can influence the sales of other categories, even if they are
not complements or substitutes (Campo et al. 2000; Heilman
et al. 2002). In this study, we also determine whether the
distance between categories and other predictors might help
explain cross-category elasticities.
To study the cross-category effects of price promotions
at the retail store level, we first develop our conceptual
framework, which includes moderators such as location
factors, intensity of promotional activity, and category
characteristics. Then, we discuss our data, propose our
model, and present the results. We conclude with mana-
gerial implications and further research directions.
Conceptual framework
We review studies on cross-category promotion effects
based on store-level data. In one of the first studies, Walters
and MacKenzie (1988) analyze the impact of price
promotions (loss leaders, double coupon promotions and
in-store price specials) on store traffic, sales of promoted
and unpromoted products, and store performance using a
structural equation approach and store-level data. They do
not find any evidence that sales of promoted items stimulate
sales of unpromoted items. Mulhern and Leone (1991) also
use weekly store-level scanner data to estimate promotion
effects between complementary categories (e.g., cake mix
and frosting) and, similar to other studies, suggest that
promotions in one category enhance sales in the other. Also
using related categories, Walters (1991) addresses two
predefined sets (cake mix and frosting; spaghetti and
spaghetti sauce) and two stores. His findings reveal
significant intrastore complementarity and substitution
effects but little evidence of interstore effects.
To achieve a better understanding of brand competition
across three subcategories of orange juice, Wedel and
Zhang (2004) develop a model that represents cross-(sub)
category price effects specific to individual brands or
SKUs. They find that the between-subcategory cross-
effects are smaller than the within-subcategory cross-
effects.
Song and Chintagunta (2006) derive econometric spec-
ifications of response models on the basis of utility
maximizing behavior at the household level. With store-
level aggregate scanner data for four product categories,
they find some evidence for cross-category price effects,
mostly driven by complementary relationships (i.e., liquid
softeners and liquid/powered laundry detergents).
Ailawadi et al. (2006, 2007) quantify the net unit and net
profit impact of promotions for a (drug) retailer by
determining the gross promotional lift, which consists of
(1) sales switched from other stores and other brands in the
same period, (2) sales switched from other brands/stores in
future periods, and (3) increases in category consumption.
They explicitly estimate a halo effect, or the extent to which
promotions affect sales of other categories in the store.
They find a positive halo effect: For every unit of gross lift,
0.16 units of some other product gets purchased elsewhere
in the store. They specify cross-category effects only at the
aggregate level. Effects are aggregated over related and
unrelated categories.
Kamakura and Kang (2007) investigate cross-category
price promotion effects among 66 stores and two related
categories (toothpaste and toothbrushes). They determine a
limited number of significant, asymmetric, intrastore
complementary and substitution effects.
Finally, Leeflang et al. (2008) modify Van Heerde et al.’s
(2004) model to allow price changes on an item in one
category to affect the purchase of items in other categories.
Because of the difficulties of accommodating cross-
category effects for many categories simultaneously, they
consider only pairs of related categories, but their model
permits both positive (complementary) and negative (sub-
stitution) cross-category effects. Their findings reveal that
complementary between-category effects are approximately
20% of the own-brand effect on revenues; between-
category substitution effects are roughly 9%. We summa-
rize these studies in Table 1.
As these summaries of the studies and outcomes show,
most research considers only a limited number of related
categories, the number and size of the cross-category effects
are small, and most effects are found between related
categories.
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Promotional effects
There is another set of studies that considers moderating
variables that may influence promotional effectiveness. We
will discuss these after we formulate our expectations about
promotional and cross-promotional effects on revenues.
Considering the limited cross-category promotional
effects in previous studies, we expect that:
P1a: The promotional effects of items/brands in category i
primarily affect revenues in category i.
P1b: The cross-promotional effects on revenues are
limited, i.e., promotional effects of items/brands in
category (i) influence the revenues of only a limited
number of other categories, j, j, i=1, …, n, j≠ i.
Furthermore, empirical findings of promotional effects at
the item/brand level (Wittink et al. 1988) and category level
(Bezawada et al. 2009; Song and Chintagunta 2007)
indicate that own elasticities are greater in absolute value
than cross elasticities. Therefore, we expect:
P2: Significant own-category elasticities are greater than
significant cross-category elasticities (in absolute
values).
Price promotions supported by a display or featured at
the SKU/brand level (or both) have substantially greater
effects than unsupported price promotions (Van Heerde et
al. 2001, 2004). We investigate whether this finding holds
at the category revenue level and expect that:
P3: The effect of a price promotion (a) within and (b)
between categories depends on support for the
promotion. Supported price promotions have greater
effects on category revenues than unsupported price
promotions.
Figure 1 represents the relations between supported
and unsupported price promotions within and between
categories.
We observe in Fig. 1 that the revenues of the
categories 1 and n are affected by supported and
unsupported price promotions in all categories i=1,...,n,
at least in principle. This also holds for the categories 2,
..., n-1. In Fig. 1 we also indicate links between the own-
and cross-price promotion elasticities and the promotion
efforts. The parameters β and δ refer to Eq. 1 that will be
introduced later. Figure 1 also depicts several moderators
that may influence promotional effectiveness: promotion-
al intensity, competition intensity within the category, and
location factors. First we discuss moderators that may
affect the own elasticities (see the left-hand top box of
Fig. 1).
Own elasticities
Promotional intensity We consider two components of
promotional intensity that may affect the estimated values
of own-price elasticities: price promotion frequency and
price promotion depth (see Nijs et al. 2001, 2007; Raju
1992).
Studies demonstrate the effect of frequency on price
promotion elasticities at both brand and category levels, but
no consensus indicates the direction of the effect.
Adaptation-level theory (Helson 1964), the associated
concept of reference price, and consumer stockpiling
behavior theory predict that price promotion frequency
leads to lower elasticities (e.g., Foekens et al. 1999),
because if promotional frequency increases, the probability
of stockpiling decreases (Helsen and Schmittlein 1992). A
higher price promotion frequency also can increase price
promotion effectiveness in the short run. Consumers learn
Table 1 Overview of studies of cross-category promotion effects, store-level data
Study Categories (Intrastore) Effects Aggregation Level
Number Related Unrelated Complementary Substitution
Walters and MacKenzie (1988) 2a – – No No Category
Mulhern and Leone (1991) 2 √ – Yes Yes Brand
Walters (1991) 2 √ – Yes Yes Brand
Wedel and Zhang (2004) 3b √ – Yes Yes (but small) SKU’s/Brands
Song and Chintagunta (2006) 4 √ – Yes Yes Brand
Ailawadi et al. (2006, 2007) 2a √ √ Yes Yes Category
Kamakura and Kang (2007) 2 √ – Yes Yes Brand
Leeflang et al. (2008) 2 (pairs of categories) √ – Yes Yes SKU’s/Categories
This study 12 and 13 √ √ Yes Yes Category
a Promoted versus non-promoted items
b Subcategories
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to buy only during price promotions (Krishna et al. 1991;
Mela et al. 1997). Nijs et al. (2001) support this positive
effect in the short run but find that it disappears in the long
run. Kumar and Pereira (1995) further show that both
positive and negative effects of frequency are possible,
depending on the schedule of promotions. Hence we are not
able to specify expectations.
Price promotion depth measures the average size of the
magnitude of discounts. Deep price cuts should result in
more additional purchases and consumer stockpiling than
lower price reductions, because deep price cuts induce
non-loyal consumers to switch categories and loyal
consumers to engage in heavier stockpiling and con-
sumption (Ailawadi et al. 2006; Raju 1992; Walters and
Bommer 1996). However, Nijs et al. (2001) find no
significant effects of price promotion depth on price
promotion elasticity, in either the short or the long run.
Therefore, we again have no specific expectations.
Category characteristics The competition intensity within a
category depends on the number of brands within it. When
a category consists of more brands, brand switching effects
dominate (Narasimhan et al. 1996; Raju 1992). The cost of
consumer search also increases with the number of brands
to be evaluated (e.g., Ratchford 1980). These arguments are
consistent with the empirical short-run effects found at the
category level (Ailawadi et al. 2006; Narasimhan et al.
1996; Raju 1992), though Nijs et al. (2001) indicate they
disappear in the long run. We therefore expect:
P4: The number of brands in a category has a negative
impact on own-category promotion elasticities.
Cross elasticities
Location factors Many studies suggest that the locations
of product categories in the store affect the estimated
values of cross-promotion category elasticities. Campo
et al. (2000) demonstrate significant, asymmetric, surface
share interdependencies among categories, some positive
and others negative. These authors, as well as Heilman et
al. (2002), reveal that the location of a category can
influence the sales of other categories, even if they are not
complements or substitutes. Based on these studies we
expect that:
P5: Cross-category promotion elasticities are larger (in
absolute value) if the distance between categories is
smaller.
1ρ
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Fig. 1 Conceptual framework
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Data
We use store-level data for 12 and 13 product categories in
the clusters of aperitifs and breakfast products, respectively,
sold in a Spanish hypermarket. One cluster consists of
categories related to aperitifs for lunch or dinner time,
whereas the other comprises categories related to breakfast
or coffee time. The clusters are based on observed customer
behavior (household baskets; see Parreño-Selva et al. 2009)
and discussions with a store manager of the Spanish
hypermarket. We analyze these clusters because (1) they
consist of a substantial number of categories, (2) they are
complements, substitutes, or unrelated, (3) they are located
close together or farther apart in the store, (4) they are
categories in which there are many price promotions, and
(5) there are few other categories in the cluster that we do
not consider. Within each cluster, products use incompara-
ble units (e.g., kilograms, cans), so we transform sales into
revenues using the average price over the whole observa-
tion period. This dependent variable has the desirable
property of varying only in terms of unit sales (see
Appendix 1). The selected product categories also achieve
high store shares, and the items within those categories are
heavily promoted. For each category, we select the top
items for our analysis, generally around 80% of category
revenues.
We have access to 1 year of item-level daily data
(301 days) of unit sales, actual prices, and features of the
items in each category. The category sales are always
positive for each day. Data for displays and regular prices
are not available. Therefore, we consider the maximum
price during the year as the regular price and calculate price
indices relative to that maximum price. That is, we measure
larger price “discounts” than those perceived by consumers
and engage in a (moderate) underestimation of promotion
effects. Almost without exception (in 99% of the cases), if
an item is featured, it also is discounted, so we do not
address a feature without price promotion, because these
data lack sufficient variability. We use only feature-
supported price and non-feature-supported price promo-
tional variables in our analysis. In Table 2, we list the total
annual turnover, number of top items, average daily prices
with corresponding standard deviations (measure of price
fluctuations), and promotional activities for each category.
Product dominance varies widely in these categories; for
sugar for example, one item enjoys a more than 80% share,
whereas in the cereal category, 23 different items all battle
for an 81% market share.
The categories from the aperitif cluster generally reveal
more price promotional activity than those of the breakfast
cluster. In the aperitif cluster, the average frequency of
supported and unsupported price promotions that exceed
5% (i.e., actual price is 5% or more below the maximum
price) is 13% (39 of 301 days) and 36% (109 of 301 days),
respectively. For the breakfast categories, these averages are
6% (19 of 301 days) and 29% (87 of 301 days),
respectively. Furthermore, the aperitif categories offer an
average daily supported price promotion of 11% and an
average daily unsupported price promotion of 9%, whereas
in the breakfast categories, the supported and unsupported
price promotions are both approximately 5%. The length of
these promotions varies between 1 day and 1 week.
The focal hypermarket is located in an area where most
of the population earns weekly salaries and lives in
relatively small houses that offer little space for stockpiling.
We confirmed these characteristics with analyses of
empirical models that account for stockpiling effects at the
item level.1 The hypermarket’s only competitor adopts an
everyday low price format.
According to our distance measures, the spaces between
the categories of different clusters are substantial. The
distances between product categories of the aperitif cluster
are greater than those of the breakfast cluster (31 and 17 m,
respectively). Furthermore, product categories contained
within the breakfast cluster are all on the first floor of the
store, whereas in the aperitif cluster, potato chips and olives
are located on the first floor, but the other categories appear
on the ground floor.
Model specification
We perform two analyses. We initially develop a category
attraction model to estimate the interdependencies among
demand categories in a store. In a second (-stage) analysis,
we estimate the effects of moderators on estimated own-
and cross-category promotion elasticities.
Category attraction model
Previous literature addresses asymmetries in the interactions
of cross-category effects at the household level (Song and
Chintagunta 2007) or store level (Wedel and Zhang 2004),
so our proposed model accounts for these asymmetries.
Asymmetries can be accommodated using hierarchical and
non-hierarchical models (see, for example, Leeflang et al.
2000, p. 287).
For our purpose we consider three different types of non-
hierarchical models:
& The Cluster Asymmetry Attraction model (CAA
model).
& The Fully Extended Attraction model (FEA model).
& The attraction model developed by Carpenter et al.
(1988) (the CCHM model).
1 These analyses are available on request.
576 J. of the Acad. Mark. Sci. (2012) 40:572–586
In the CAA model (Vanden Abeele et al. 1990) it is
assumed that the market can be structured as cluster of
items (in our case: categories). Criteria are specified a
priori, such that the use of each criterion results in the
identification of one or more clusters. If clustering is
effective, competition within clusters is stronger than
between items of different clusters. The approach allows
clusters to be overlapping, i.e., items may belong to
more than one cluster. The CAA model incorporates
cross-effects which are related to a priori defined
clusters of items by introducing one asymmetry param-
eter per clustering criterion. Given that asymmetric
competition is modeled parsimoniously and requires the
estimation of a too small number of parameters this
approach is less appropriate to estimate cross-promotion
effects.
Table 2 Descriptive statistics, category level
Total annual
turnover*
Number of
top items
Average
daily
price**
Supported Price Promotions Unsupported Price Promotions
Number
of days
Number of days
discount exceeds 5%
Average daily
discount (%)
Number
of days
Number of days
discount exceeds 5%
Average daily
discount (%)
Aperitif product categories
Bottle of beer, 1 l 51.78 5 0.66 (4.95) 36 35 4.36 75 47 5.48
Can of beer, 33 cl 146.52 4 0.28 (2.88) 67 62 10.66 82 72 6.58
Can of mussels 23.34 9 1.06 (16.47) 89 89 24.16 160 130 14.62
Can of cockles 75.48 20 1.94 (29.88) 30 28 15.18 147 119 5.25
Can of clams 13.86 4 1.14 (34.37) 71 71 16.64 164 126 10.21
Can of tuna in oil 16.68 6 1.01 (9.54) 89 77 8.84 156 123 8.72
Can of asparagus 22.98 11 1.40 (18.20) 18 18 17.54 133 90 10.45
Bottle of red wine 18.06 12 1.57 (19.19) 16 14 5.21 176 125 9.41
Bottle of white/
rose wine
68.52 16 2.15 (17.11) 17 16 7.25 144 93 7.73
Bag of potato
chips
68.88 13 0.88 (15.09) 13 13 4.99 201 201 18.63
Can of stuffed
olives
42.36 8 0.64 (8.10) 33 33 16.22 209 164 9.59
Can of razorshells 12.66 6 1.98 (22.10) 11 11 1.54 32 21 3.14
Breakfast product categories
Juice mini brick 68.28 15 1.03 (1.22) 35 35 13.19 207 135 5.12
Bottle of juice,
1 l
66.36 22 0.61 (0.77) 47 47 5.99 398 343 15.67
Pack of standard
cookies
44.76 10 1.09 (2.31) 28 25 9.91 192 95 6.55
Pack of filled
cookies
35.34 9 0.60 (1.62) 20 19 8.91 187 76 4.59
Pack of soluble
cocoa
63.00 6 3.54 (3.11) 19 13 7.28 206 84 4.69
Pack of soluble
coffee
90.54 6 2.53 (0.71) 45 0 2.15 179 2 1.87
Pack of normal
coffee
55.80 13 1.14 (2.55) 64 60 9.75 203 170 7.78
Brick of
unskimmed milk
1 l
174.66 13 0.61 (0.85) 29 29 3.90 113 41 1.70
Brick of skimmed
milk, 1 l
47.22 6 0.58 (0.53) 15 13 2.76 81 29 1.25
Brick of semi-
skimmed milk,
1 l
74.28 7 0.59 (0.58) 5 2 0.90 108 5 2.10
Brick of enriched
milk, 1 l
115.20 14 0.74 (10.83) 2 2 0.56 25 15 1.33
Pack of cereal 55.56 23 1.57 (14.13) 6 6 2.44 204 131 6.58
Pack of normal
sugar, 1 kg
42.00 1 0.93 (0.00) 0 0 0.00 2 2 0.00
*Turnover is measured in thousands of Euros. **Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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The FEA model is the only one that allows for complete
flexibility in the cross-competitive effects of the product
categories’ marketing variables (see, for example, Leeflang
et al. 2000, p. 287). This model allows for unique
parameters between and within all categories, at least in
principle. However, it seems unrealistic to assume that in a
market with many product categories, all cross-category
effects are non-zero and unique. In addition, even with a
modest number of product categories, the FEA model poses
estimation problems. For example, if the number of product
categories J is 13, we would have 494 parameters in the
system of equations. An estimation sample of 1 year of daily
observations (301) for 13 product categories contains 3,913
(301×13) observations. Thus, we must restrict the compet-
itive structure.2 To this end we calibrate the CCHM model.
This model has been developed to study asymmetric
competition among many brands in a single product
category. We apply it in a new setting and instead
consider competition across product categories within a
store, driven by supported and unsupported price
promotions. Foekens et al. (1997) apply this model with
different demand levels that account for interactions
between the item and brand level. Campo et al. (2000)
use this model to investigate the impact of location
characteristics on the relative attractiveness of product
categories within a store. However, they fail to consider
the cross-category effects of price promotions.
We perform two analyses of two separate clusters of
products: aperitifs and breakfast products. We assume
no relations between these two clusters, because the
purpose and timing of their consumption (in Spain at
least) differs, and (almost) all categories of one cluster
sell on a different floor than the categories of the other.
The demand interdependencies within each cluster may
be positive, negative, or zero. We determine potential
non-zero cross-relations, in line with a specification of
the CCHM model, and calibrate the model for each cluster.
To estimate the parameters of the CCHM model, we
undertake three consecutive steps, each of which
consists of several substeps (see Table 3). First, we
estimate the parameters of an extended attraction (EA)
model for each product category. Second, we identify
cross-category effects by cross-correlating the residuals of
a given product category with each marketing variable of
every competitive product category within the same
cluster of (12 or 13) categories. Therefore, we recognize
potential cross-category effects on the basis of the
statistical significance of the simple correlations (p<
0.05). Third, to estimate the CCHM model, we add the
supported price (index) and unsupported price (index) of
categories identified as potential sources of asymmetric
competition for a given product category to the indepen-
dent variables of the EA model. The resulting asymmetric
CCHM model can formally be represented as:
RSi;t ¼ Atti;tPJ
j¼1
Attj;t
¼
exp Ciþ
P12
m¼2
limMonthm;tþ
P
r2 i;Wið Þ
birSPIr;tþ
P
r2 i;Xið Þ
dirNSPIr;t
" #
PJ
j¼1
exp Cjþ
P12
m¼2
ljmMonthm;tþ
P
v2 j;Wjð Þ
bjvSPIv;tþ
P
v2 j;Xjð Þ
djvNSPIv;t
" # þ ui;t;
ð1Þ
where RSi,t is the revenue share of product category i at
time t; Atti,t is the attraction of category i at time t; j=1, ...,
i, ..., J; Ci is the intercept of category i; Monthm,t is a
monthly dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if period
(day) t belongs to month m and 0 otherwise, with m=2, ...,
12; SPIi,t is a measure of the supported price (index) of
category i at time t; NSPIi,t is a measure of the
unsupported (non supported) price (index) of category i
at time t; and Wi and Xi represent subsets of categories
with potential supported and unsupported cross-price
(index) effects on the revenue share of product category
i, respectively, obtained from the residual analyses (second
stage), and ui,t is the disturbance term. If r≠ i, the
parameters βir and δir represent the supported and
unsupported cross-price (index) effects of category r on
Atti,t, respectively. If r=i, the parameters βii and δii
represent the supported and unsupported own-price (index)
effects on Atti,t, respectively. We include a monthly dummy
variable to take into account the seasonal effects of some
product categories. For example, in Spain, the heat of
summer months prompts increased consumption of beer and
declining consumption of red wine. We provide the mea-
surement details of RSi,t, SPIi,t, and NSPIi,t in Appendix 1.
To estimate the parameters of Eq. 1, we use log-
centering (Cooper and Nakanishi 1988). Because we use
shares of categories that belong to the same cluster, we do
not need to account for day-of-the-week effects and
trends in sales. In turn, we do not apply a filtering
technique (cf. Leeflang et al. 2008). If we apply ordinary
least squares (OLS) to Eq. 1, the estimates are unbiased
but not efficient (Foekens et al. 1997), because ui,t does
not follow the usual assumptions required for OLS
estimation. In general, ui,t is contemporaneously correlat-
ed with uj,t, j≠ i, because we estimate Eq. 1 simultaneous-
ly for all categories j=1, ..., J, and it represents a system
of J seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR; cf. Zellner
1962). The SUR estimation procedure accounts for
heteroscedasticity and contemporaneous correlation in
2 The FEA model includes a constant term, 11 month dummies, and
13×2 (supported and unsupported) promotion effects for each
category, which means 13 1þ 11þ 26ð Þ ¼ 494 parameters.
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the errors across equations; it also yields unbiased and
efficient parameter estimates.
As the expression for the corresponding cross-elasticities
(ignoring the time subscript t) shows, the CCHM model
accommodates asymmetric competition:
SCPIRic ¼ bic 
X
s2Kc
RSsbsc
 !
SPIc; and
NSCPIRic ¼ dic 
X
s2Qc
RSsdsc
 !
NSPIc i 6¼ c;
ð2Þ
where SCPIRic is the supported cross-price (index) elastic-
ity of category c on the revenue share of category i;
NSCPIRic is the unsupported (non supported) cross-price
(index) elasticity of category c on the revenue share of
category i; and Kc and Qc represent subsets of categories
affected by the supported and unsupported price (index),
respectively, of product category c. From Eq. 2, if i=c, we
can obtain the equivalent expression for own elasticities:
SOPIRic and NSOPIRic respectively.
In the first step, to estimate the parameters of the
CCHM model, we estimate the parameters of the EA
model using the SUR estimation procedures for both
clusters (not shown here). Specifically, we delete one
equation (category) of the system for each cluster (e.g.,
can of razorshells for aperitifs; sugar for the breakfast
cluster), because the sum of the disturbances equals 0
for each t. The Durbin-Watson statistics and an analysis of
all residuals indicate that several residual series follow
autoregressive processes. Therefore, we follow Park’s
(1967) procedure to detect autocorrelation in SURs and
use the Prais-Winsten transformation to remove autocor-
relations (Greene 2003).
In the second step, we obtain 22 of the 484 possible
significant correlations between the residuals from the
EA model and the cross-promotional variables of the
competing categories, which feature 13 in the aperitif
cluster and 9 in the breakfast cluster. That is, we
identify 22 potential cross-category effects. We do not
expect interdependencies across all categories within a
cluster, nor do we make any assumption about which
cross-category effects we will find, because we expect
interdependencies between unrelated (complementary
and substitute) categories.
In the third step of our estimation procedure, we add
variables with significant correlations to the CCHM
model and then estimate the model using a SUR
estimation procedure. The own- and cross-price (index)
elasticities of this model appear in Table 4. The
elasticities measure the impact of the supported and
unsupported price index (SPI, NSPI) of items in the
category on the category’s revenue share. They also
measure the impact of the supported and unsupported
price index on the revenues of the category, because the
revenues of the cluster (i.e., total category revenues) are
Table 3
St
ep
 
1
1. Specify and estimate the parameters of an extended attraction (EA) model for each product category. 
This EA model has the following structure:
(T1)
where are the disturbance terms.
2. Determine the residuals and specify the variance-covariance matrix of the disturbances ( 1).
3. Estimate the EA model using and obtain SUR estimates for the EA model.
St
ep
2 4.
Identify cross-category effects by relating the residuals ( ) of Eq. T1 to all marketing variables 
of every competitive product category within the same cluster.
5. Determine which variables from other categories have statistically significant effects on
St
ep
 
3
6.
7.
8. Determine the residuals
,i tû , i = 1,…, n (n = 12 or 13).
9. Use the residuals to specify the variance-covariance matrix ( ) of the disturbances.
10.
Estimation procedure to calibrate Eq. 1
Add these variables to the (asymmetric) CCHM model (see Eq.1).
Estimate Eq. 1 using ordinary least squares.
Estimate Eq. 1 using 
(2)
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not affected by the promotional activities.3 Our analysis
of all series of residuals indicates no autocorrelation
problems.
Explaining promotion elasticities: effects of moderators
We next attempt to explain own- and cross-category
promotion elasticities through a second (-stage) analysis.
Own elasticities We find 14 (of 23) significant supported
and 8 (of 23) unsupported own-price (index) elasticities.
There are several possible explanations for the (absolute
value of the) un/supported own price (index) (NSOPIR*/
SOPIR*)4 elasticities across product categories, including
discount frequency (supported SDFi or unsupported
NSDFi), discount depth (supported SDDi or unsupported
NSDDi), and competitive intensity (CI). We derive
SOPIR
»
i ¼ 8 0 þ 8 1SDFi þ 8 2SDDi þ 8 3CIi þ "i; and
NSOPIR
»
i ¼ g0 þ g1NSDFi þ g2NSDDi þ g3CIi þ ϑi;
ð3Þ
for all i=1, ..., j, ..., J, such that 8 d and gd for d=0, .., 3 are
parameters; and εi and ϑi are disturbance terms. We
provide the measurement details of these variables in
Appendix 2.
The models in this second (-stage) analysis incorporate
heteroscedastic errors (Wittink 1977), so we use a gener-
alized least squares estimation procedure to account for
heteroscedastic errors (Greene 2003).
Cross-category elasticities Because we find a limited num-
ber of significant cross-elasticities, we consider supported and
unsupported promotion elasticities simultaneously.
We introduce and use a binary dependent variable that
uses two values (0 and 1; a dummy) to distinguish between
significant and insignificant cross-price (index) elasticities,
DCPIRic.
5 We specify a logit model to explain cross-
promotion elasticities. In this case, we use the distance
between two categories i and c (DCic) and two dummy
variables as predictor variables. The first dummy variable
distinguishes supported from unsupported cross-price (in-
dex) elasticities (DCFic), whereas the second distinguishes
between cross-elasticities in product categories located on
the ground floor and those on the first floor (DFLic). Thus,
DCPIRic ¼ r0 þ r1DCic þ r2DCFic þ r3DFLicþwic;
for all j ¼ 1 . . . ; i . . . ; c; . . . ; J ; i 6¼ c; ð4Þ
where
DCPIRic ¼
1 if SCPIRic 6¼ 0 orNSCPIRic 6¼ 0
0 otherwise:
(
In addition, ρl for l=0, .., 3 are parameters, and ωic is a
disturbance term. We provide the measurement details of
these variables in Appendix 2.
Empirical results
Category attraction model (Eq. 1)
We provide the estimation results in Table 4.
Own effects The results from the CCHM model (Table 4)
demonstrate that in 46% of cases, price promotions expand
own-category revenues. This confirms P1a. In one case
(2%), the price promotions reduce own revenues, and in
52% of cases, they have no effect. These results show some
correspondence with the findings presented by Nijs et al.
(2001; i.e., 58%, 5%, and 37%, respectively). In contrast to
the significant promotional effects, the unsupported price
promotions of enriched milk reduce its own revenues,
likely because of the frequent use of unsupported price
promotions for lower priced items, which cause consumers
to substitute for higher priced items.
Cross-category effects As we also reveal in Table 4, the
significant asymmetric demand interdependencies, both
positive and negative, are similar to Duvvuri et al.’s
(2007), Leeflang et al.’s (2008), Manchanda et al.’s (1999),
and Walters’s (1991) findings regarding cross-category
effects. We find 18 significant cross-promotional effects, 9
in each cluster, or 4% of all possible pairs (consistent with
the 5% indicated by Hruschka et al. 1999). The probability
that a price promotion in a category affects the sales of at
least one other category is 0.61 (14 out of 23). The number
of categories affected is low (1 or 2 of 10 or 11 potential
categories per cluster), which confirms P1b. The limited
number of cross-promotional effects in prior studies that
consider far fewer categories therefore is not due to the small
number of categories. We also find that 39% of significant
3 These analyses are available on request.
4 Given that we now consider absolute values we add an *-sign to the
variables.
5 We also use as a dependent variable the absolute value of significant
and insignificant cross-price (index) elasticities. However, the results
do not improve. Therefore, the magnitude of cross-elasticities does not
depend on the distances between categories, but the probability of
interdependencies between categories depends on these distances.
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cross-promotional effects are negative (positive price elas-
ticities) and 61% are positive (negative price elasticities),
which indicate substitutes and complementarities, respec-
tively. The finding of more complementaries than substitutes
corresponds with Leeflang et al.’s (2008) results.
In the aperitif cluster, for example, the revenues of
mussels increase in response to supported price promotions
of beer and olives.6 Negative cross-promotional effects also
emerge; for example, the unsupported price promotions of
asparagus diminish the revenues of beer. Even though the
mussels category shares several brand names with the
cockles category, unlike Erdem and Sun (2002), we do not
find interdependencies between them.
We instead find interdependencies between categories
that are not traditionally perceived as complementaries or
substitutes, such as the effect of (supported and unsupport-
ed) price promotions of tuna on the revenues of clams or
the previously noted effect of unsupported price promotions
of asparagus on the revenues of beer. Campo et al. (2000)
find similar types of cross-category effects; they may result
from the proximity of the product categories in the store.
Interdependencies in the breakfast cluster similarly may be
due to proximity; 11% of the significant cross-promotional
elasticities in this cluster occur between categories located
closest to each other (e.g., normal coffee with skim milk,
Table 4 Own- and cross-price (index) elasticities
Category Promoted Own-Elasticities Category Affected Cross-Elasticities
SPI NSPI SPI NSPI
Aperitif Cluster
Beer 1 l n.s. n.s. –
Beer33cl −0.88 (0.16) −1.15 (0.38) Mussels −0.18 (0.15)
Red wine −0.27 (0.28)
Mussels −0.48 (0.13) n.s. Beer 33cl −0.22 (0.12)
Cockles n.s. n.s. –
Clams −1.31 (0.40) −1.02 (0.48) –
Tuna n.s. n.s. Clams −0.72 (0.38) 1.05 (0.48)
Asparagus −0.91 (0.15) n.s. Beer 1 l 0.77 (0.31)
Red wine n.s. −0.99 (0.45) Olives −1.39 (0.35)
White/rose wine −0.82 (0.36) −2.62 (0.66) –
Potato chips −0.25 (0.15) n.s. Tuna −0.29 (0.12)
Olives −0.48 (0.22) n.s. Mussels −0.50 (0.22)
Breakfast Cluster
Juice mini n.s. n.s. –
Juice 1 l −0.48 (0.20) n.s. Soluble cocoa −0.47 (0.26)
Standard cookies −0.45 (0.12) n.s. –
Filled cookies −0.44 (0.19) n.s. –
Soluble cocoa −0.80 (0.33) n.s. –
Soluble coffee −8.07 (1.02) n.s. Normal coffee 3.74 (0.98)
Normal coffee n.s. −1.01 (0.29) Soluble cocoa 0.57 (0.25)
Skimmed milk 1.31 (0.31)
Unskimmed milk n.s. −0.31 (0.19) Normal coffee −0.43 (0.15)
Skimmed milk −0.28 (0.15)
Skimmed milk n.s. n.s. Semi-skimmed milk 0.42 (0.13)
Semi-skimmed milk −0.96 (0.03) −1.00 (0.39) –
Enriched milk n.s. 0.14 (0.07) Semi-skimmed milk 0.56 (0.18)
Cereal −0.53 (0.04) n.s. Standard cookies −0.61 (0.23)
Standard errors are in parentheses. SPI = (feature-) supported price (index), NSPI = unsupported price (index). n.s. = not significant
6 In the Spanish gastronomic culture, products such as mussels, olives, and
beer are complementary products, often consumed together as aperitifs.
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enriched milk with semi-skim milk), and 83% are between
categories whose distance is less than the average distance
across categories in the cluster. Only 6% occur between
categories at great distances apart (e.g., red wine and
olives). This finding corresponds to P5; we also test P5
more formally in a subsequent analysis.
Comparing the own- and cross-category elasticities, we
find that in general and in absolute value, the significant
own-category elasticities are greater than the significant
cross-category elasticities (1.11 and 0.85, respectively), in
support of P2.
In both categories, the percentage of significant own
supported price promotion effects (7 out of 11/12) is greater
than that of own unsupported price promotion effects (4 out of
11/12), in line with Van Heerde et al. (2001, 2004), which
confirms P3a. We also discover more significant supported
price cross-elasticities than unsupported ones (P3b).
Explaining promotion elasticities: effects of moderators
(Eqs. 3 and 4)
Own elasticities Table 5 shows that there is no evidence to
confirm that the magnitude of non-supported own-price
(index) elasticities is affected by the depth of the discounts,
nor do we find evidence that discount frequency, influence
the own-price (index) elasticities, whether supported or not.
However, the deep discounts lead to supported own-price
(index) elasticities that are greater (in absolute value)
(8^ 2 ¼ 2:70; p=0.09), which suggests that deep discounts
induce non-loyal consumers to switch categories and loyal
consumers to engage in heavier stockpiling and consump-
tion behaviors (Ailawadi et al. 2006; Krishna 1994; Raju
1992; Walters and Bommer 1996). At the 11% level we find
evidence that competitive intensity has a significant effect on
the absolute value of the own price elasticities (P4).
Cross-category elasticities As Table 6 shows, the probabil-
ity of interdependencies between pairs of categories
increases when the spatial distance between them decreases,
Table 5 Parameter estimates of promotional intensity and category
characteristic effects on own promotional elasticities
SOPIR
»
i ¼ 1:47þ 0:01 SDFi þ 2:70cÞ  SDDi þ 0:10 CIi
ð0:91Þ ð0:02Þ ð1:42Þ ð0:06Þ
NSOPIR
»
i ¼ 0:73þ 0:0002 NSDFi  0:52 NSDDi þ 0:03 CIi
ð0:47Þ ð0:004Þ ð4:54Þ ð0:03Þ
R-squared=0.23
Adjusted R-squared=0.16
where:
ðNÞSOPIR»i = the absolute value of the own (un-) supported price
(index) elasticity of category i,
(N)SDFi = the (un-) supported discount frequency of category i,
(N)SDDi = the (un-) supported discount depth of category i,
CIi = competitive intensity of category i.
Standard errors are in parentheses
a p<0.01
b p<0.05
c p<0.10
Table 6 Parameter estimates of distance effects on cross-promotional elasticities
DCPIRic ¼ 2:87» 0:02»»» DCic þ 0:23 DCFic þ 0:16 DFLic
0:45ð Þ 0:01ð Þ 0:63ð Þ 0:75ð Þ
McFadden R-squared=0.11
where:
DCPIRic ¼
1 if SCPIRic 6¼ 0 or NSCPIRic 6¼ 0
0 otherwise;
(
SCPIRic = the supported cross-price (index) elasticity of category c on the revenue share of category i,
NSCPIRic = the unsupported cross-price (index) elasticity of category c on the revenue share of category i,
DCic = the spatial distance between product categories i and c (note that DCic ≡ DCci),
DCFic = dummy variable that takes a value 1 if the cross-price (index) elasticity of category c on category i is feature supported and 0 if it is
unsupported,
DFLic ¼
1 if categories i and c are located on the ground floor of the store
0 otherwise:
(
Standard errors are in parentheses
*p<0.01
**p<0.05
***p<0.10
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in support of P5. However, this evidence is moderate
( r^1 ¼ 0:02; p=0.08) and reflects the modest number of
significant cross-category effects. The results provide no
evidence that the probability of interdependencies between
pairs of categories depends on the floor on which they are sold
or whether discounts receive promotional support (Table 7).
Conclusions
Retailers may benefit from cross-category promotion
effects if the cross-category complementary effects are
greater than the cross-category substitution effects. Extant
studies consider interdependencies among a limited number
of related product categories at the item demand level and
use weekly data. We instead develop a framework for the
impact of price promotions and features on category
performance, in which we consider interdependencies
among a substantial number of related and less related
categories at the category demand level. With this model,
an individual store can estimate store-specific effects using
daily data. To explain category revenue share, we rely on
the asymmetric multiplicative competitive interaction struc-
ture developed by Carpenter et al. (1988) to model a
substantial number of cross-category effects (CCHM
model) and account for both positive and negative cross-
category effects. Positive cross-category effects are com-
mon among complementary goods, but they also may exist
when the same brand name appears on items that belong to
multiple categories (i.e., umbrella branding, Erdem and Sun
2002) or if an attractively priced item represents part of a
set that tends to be purchased together (e.g., loss leaders,
Mulhern and Leone 1991). Negative cross-category effects,
in contrast, imply substitution.
Because of the difficulties of accommodating cross-
category effects for many categories at the same time, we
apply the CCHM model to two clusters (aperitifs and
breakfast products) independently. The CCHM model
employs an empirical stepwise approach to determine
relevant instruments with cross-effects.
Overall, 46% of price promotions, both supported and
unsupported, expand own-category revenues (or revenue
share), 2% reduce own revenues, and 52% have no
effect. These percentages imply that more than half of
all price promotions lead to substitution effects between
items/brands within a category, without contributing to
the revenues of the promoted categories. The supported
price (index) has a greater impact on own revenues than
does the unsupported price (index). On average, a
decrease (in the short term) of 10% in the supported
price (index) increases (daily) own revenues by 12%,
whereas a 10% decrease in the unsupported price
(index) leads to an increase of 10.30% of (daily) own
revenues. These magnitudes also are in line with Nijs et
al. (2001). However, the magnitude of own-price (index)
elasticity varies across product categories, such that the
effectiveness of supported price promotions for increasing
category revenues is greater in categories with deeper
supported discounts and when there are more competitors
within the category. This result confirms findings from
previous studies (Krishna 1994; Raju 1992). We find no
evidence that categories with deeper unsupported dis-
counts have higher unsupported own-price (index) elas-
ticities. Nor do we find evidence that the frequency of
discounts affects the magnitude of own-price (index)
elasticities, whether supported or unsupported.
A promotional price change in a category has, on
average, a 61% probability of affecting the revenues (or
revenue share) of at least one other category. The number of
categories affected by the price promotion of a focal
category is one or two. In our study, 61% of the cross-
price (index) effects are negative (complementary), and
39% are positive (substitution). The substitution elasticities
tend to be greater than the complementary elasticities that
measure effects (1.20 and −0.49, respectively).
The probability of interdependencies between categories
increases if they are located near each other, though our
evidence is moderate (p=0.08). This finding corresponds with
Campo et al.’s (2000) and Heilman et al.’s (2002) results.
Managerial implications
Price promotions generally lead to short-term sales
increases; there is significant doubt, however, about
whether increases lead to more profit for retailers and/or
manufacturers. We investigate whether promotions benefit
revenues through cross-promotional effects and find that
half of the promotions lead to substitution effects between
items/brands within a category, without increasing the
revenues of the categories. That is, many (price) promo-
tions lead to substitution effects between items/brands
within a category. The number of categories affected by a
promotion is limited. Furthermore, cross-promotional
effects lead to not only more revenues in complementary
categories but also substitution effects, perhaps due to the
budget restrictions consumers experience when they shop.
The argument widely used by manufacturers when they ask
for promotional allowances by pinpointing cross-
promotional effects thus has not much real value. Retailers
that allow manufacturer-dominated promotions can create
cross-promotional benefits only if these promotions are
supported and when the other categories that may be
affected are located close by in the store. These boundary
conditions demand a better understanding by store and
category managers about the customer-based relations
between categories. In addition, manufacturers that supply
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items/brands in different categories to channel members
should recognize that cross-promotional effects are very
limited.
Directions for further research
The ongoing focus on cross-category effects has great
theoretical and substantive importance. Scholars interested
in understanding consumer behavior therefore should
continue to explore the purchase and consumption charac-
teristics that explain category dependencies.
This study pertains to clusters of product categories
in a Spanish hypermarket. Hence we realize that our
findings are just a new “data point” that gives insights
into the effects of cross-promotions. Although the model
we develop can be applied fruitfully in other, similar
contexts, we cannot generalize our specific findings.
Researchers therefore are readily invited to apply our
methodology to other combinations of product catego-
ries in other stores. We applied the CCHM model to
account for asymmetries in competition between cate-
gories which is also a limitation. A more flexible model
that requires many more observations to estimate a high
number of parameter such as the FEA model may be
more appropriate. Another model that accounts for
asymmetric competition, the CAA model, which has
much less parameters and which is more difficult to
estimate might be another option to find cross-
promotional effects between categories.
In this study we studied cross-category effects for a
retailer (at the store level). Manufacturers such as Phillips,
Procter & Gamble and Unilever that sell products in
multiple product categories could also benefit from a better
understanding of these cross-category effects. This points to
another future research opportunity.
Marketing research devotes much attention to short-
and long-term effects of price promotions and has
revealed generally that their long-term effects are limited
for retailers and manufacturers (Nijs et al. 2001). We
further demonstrate that cross-promotional effects are
limited, even if we consider a substantial number of
categories. However, not many studies consider the effects
of non-price promotions, and we lack sufficient knowl-
edge of their effects. Academics therefore should direct
their attention to the effects of non-price promotions to
formulate answers to questions about whether these
promotions lead to higher revenues in the same and other
categories and to what degree.
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Appendix 1
Variable operationalization of category attraction model
Revenue share of product category
We use the revenue share of a product category as a criterion
variable to compare the sales (units) of many different
categories measured in incomparable units (kilograms, cans,
etc.). First, we create a currency measure of item revenues in
period t by multiplying daily unit sales of an item s that
belongs to category i with the average price for this item
across the sample. We use the average price (item-specific
constant) to maintain the desirable property that demand
varies only in terms of unit sales and multiply unit sales by a
constant that has only a scaling effect. Second, we calculate
the category revenues in t by aggregating the item revenues
of the items that belong to category i. Third, we calculate the
revenue share of each product category (RSi,t) by dividing
the revenues of the category by the sum of the revenues of
all product categories that belong to the same cluster.
Table 7 Overview of expectations
Expectations Support ?
P1: The promotional effects of SKUs/brands in category i (a) primarily affect revenues in category i, Yes
and (b) influence the revenues of only a limited number of other categories (i.e., cross-promotional effects). Yes
P2: Significant own-category elasticities are larger than cross-category elasticities (in absolute values). Yes
P3: Effect of a promotion: (a) within (b) between categories is affected by the support of a promotion. Yes
Supported price promotions have greater effects on category revenues than unsupported price promotions.
P4: The number of brands in a category has a negative impact on own price elasticities. Yes Confirmed at the 11% level
P5: Cross-promotion elasticities are larger (in absolute value) if the distance between the categories is smaller. Yes
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Supported and unsupported price (index)
In our data at the item level, we cannot distinguish promotional
prices from regular prices and instead calculate price indices
relative to the maximum price,7 following Foekens et al.
(1999), Nijs et al. (2007), and Raju (1992). We estimate
separate effects for two price index variables, based on
supported and unsupported prices. Unsupported prices (index)
are those not supported by featuring activities for the item
with the discount in the same period. We calculate the
minimum value of the supported price (index) across all items
s in category i at time t (s=1, ..., S(i)), and define this value as
the category-supported price (index) measure (SPIit). We use a
similar method to obtain the unsupported price (index)
measure of category i at time t (NSPIit). Therefore:
SPIit ¼ Min SPIi1;t; . . . ; SPIis;t; . . . ; SPIiSðiÞ;t
 
; and
NSPIit ¼ Min NSPIi1;t; . . . ;NSPIis;t; . . . ;NSPIiSðiÞ;t
 
;
ðA:1Þ
where:
SPIis;t ¼ PIis;t if FEATis;t ¼ 10 otherwise;

NSPIis;t ¼ PIis;t if FEATis;t ¼ 00 otherwise;

PIis;t ¼ Pis;tPmaxis
;
Pmaxis ¼ Max Pis;1; . . . ;Pis;T
 
;
and
FEATis,t = dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if
item s, which belongs to product category i,
is featured at time t, and 0 otherwise.
We also define other (un-)supported price (index)
measures of the category, such as the (market share)
weighted and unweighted average of the (un-)supported
price (index) across all items in a category. We applied the
algorithm by Van Heerde (1999) that runs through daily
actual price observations and determines which prices are
regular and which are promotional. However, using these or
other (un-)supported price (index) measures of the category
does not improve the models’ validity.
Appendix 2
Variable operationalization of promotion elasticities models
Discount frequency
The supported discount frequency at the item level consists
of the number of days that each item is discounted with
feature support in excess of 5%. The supported discount
frequency at the category level equals the market share
weighted average of the item-supported discount frequen-
cies. We obtain the unsupported discount frequencies using
similar methods.
Discount depth
We measure the magnitude of the supported/unsupported
discount offered by an item as the difference between
the maximum price in that year (regular price) and the
actual price on that day. By averaging the magnitude of
(un-)supported discounts, we obtain a measure of (un-)
supported price promotion depth. Furthermore, by
computing a market share weighted average of the
(un-)supported discounts offered on the items in the
product category, we realize the category (un-)supported
price promotion depth.
Our discount frequency and discount depth measures are
conceptually similar to those adopted by Foekens et al.
(1999), Nijs et al. (2001, 2007), and Raju (1992).
Competitive intensity
Our measure of competitive intensity involves the number
of items in a category and is conceptually similar to that
adopted by Narasimhan et al. (1996), Nijs et al. (2001,
2007), and Raju (1992).
Distance between categories
We measure the literal distance between categories in meters.
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